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THE COMMON LAW POWERS OF THE
NEVADA ATTORNEY GENERAL: RYAN V.
EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
Robert Stewart*
The office of the attorney general derived from thirteenth-century England
and voyaged with the American settlers across the Atlantic, ultimately taking
root in each of the thirteen original colonies.1 There, the colonial attorneys
general took on a wide variety of duties,2 many of which originated from the
common law, such as being “intrusted with the management of all legal affairs
and the prosecution of all suits, civil and criminal, in which the crown was
interested.”3 Time passed, the nation expanded, and now every state wields an
attorney general.4 The majority of states uphold their attorneys general’s com-
mon law powers5—while simultaneously authorizing legislatures to withdraw
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1 See William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General,
and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2449–50 (2006).
2 For example, in 1708, the duties of the South Carolina Attorney General were specified as
follows:
[T]o Act, Plead, Implead, Sue and Prosecute all and every Person & Persons whatsoever, for all
Debts, Fines, Amerciaments, Forfeitures, Escheats Claims and Demands whatsoever which now
is or may or Shall be Due and in Arrears to Us upon any Account whatsoever whither Rents,
Revenues or otherwise howsoever, And to Prosecute all Matters Criminall as well as Civill Giv-
ing and hereby Granting unto You full Power and authority and the Premises therein to Deal Doe
Execute and Performe in as large and Ample manner to all Intents and Purposes as to the Said
office of Attorney Generall doth in any way Appertaine & bellong . . . .
NAT’L ASS’N OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL: POWERS AND RESPON-
SIBILITIES 7 (Lynne M. Ross ed.) (1990) (alteration in original) (citing Oliver W. Hammonds,
The Attorney General in the American Colonies, in 2 ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY
SERIES 18 (Paul M. Hamlin ed., 1939)).
3 State v. Finch, 280 P. 910, 912 (Kan. 1929); see also Rita W. Cooley, Predecessors of the
Federal Attorney General: The Attorney General in England and the American Colonies, 2
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 304, 309–10 (1958) (identifying many of the attorneys general’s
“numerous” common law powers).
4 See Note, Appointing State Attorneys General: Evaluating the Unbundled State Executive,
127 HARV. L. REV. 973, 980 (2014).
5 Justin G. Davids, Note, State Attorneys General and the Client-Attorney Relationship:
Establishing the Power to Sue State Officers, 38 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 365, 372
(2005).
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those powers, either entirely or partially6—whereas the minority of states com-
pletely disavow their attorneys general’s common law powers.7
The issue of whether a state’s attorney general possesses common law
powers lends to significant implications. For example, in the realm of intra-
executive conflicts between the governor and attorney general—conflicts such
as disagreeing whether to defend a challenged state law or whether to challenge
the constitutionality of a federal law8—the existence or absence of the attorney
general’s common law powers may impact whether the attorney general may
take a position adverse to the governor’s.9 Perhaps the Nevada Supreme
6 See id.; see, e.g., Padgett v. Williams, 348 P.2d 944, 948 (Idaho 1960) (concluding that
“the office of attorney general is not constitutionally vested with any common law powers
and duties that are immune to legislative change”); Johnson v. Commonwealth ex rel. Mere-
dith, 165 S.W.2d 820, 826, 829 (Ky. 1942) (holding that the Kentucky General Assembly
may withdraw the attorney general’s common law powers, and identifying nine other states
that hold similarly). Illinois, by contrast, prohibits the deprivation of the attorney general’s
common law powers. See Envtl. Prot. Agency v. Pollution Control Bd., 372 N.E.2d 50, 52
(1977) (“[N]either the legislature nor the judiciary may deprive the Attorney General of his
common law powers under the Constitution.”).
7 See Davids, supra note 5, at 372 & n.32 (noting that Arizona, Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa,
New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin “seem to have aban-
doned” their attorneys general’s common law powers).
8 Recently, the passage of the Federal Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010
drove deep divides between many states’ governors and attorneys general, including
Nevada’s. See Kevin Sack, In Partisan Battle, Governors Clash with Attorneys General
Over Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, March 28, 2010, at A25; Benjamin Spillman, Official: Filing
Lawsuit a Waste, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., March 31, 2010, at 1A. At the time of writing this
Note, the issue of defending a state marriage law placed Kentucky’s attorney general at odds
with its governor, just as the issue of whether to enforce a marriage law did for New York’s
a decade ago. See Trip Gabriel, Kentucky Law Official Will Not Defend Ban on Same-Sex
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, March 5, 2014, at A17; Marc Santora & Thomas Crampton, Same-
Sex Weddings in Upstate Village Test New York Law, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2004, at A1.
9 In many states, the attorney general is required to represent multiple interests, including
both those of the governor and those of the public interest. See Scott M. Matheson, Jr.,
Constitutional Status and Role of the State Attorney General, 6 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1,
12–13 (1993). In many states, the duty to represent the public interest derives from the
common law. Id. at 4.  Occasionally, the attorney general will determine that the representa-
tion of the public interest conflicts with the representation of the governor. Id. at 13. In these
instances, the attorney general will perhaps choose to represent the attorney general’s inter-
pretation of the public interest, thereby taking a position contrary to the governor’s. When
these conflicts must be resolved in court, some courts rule in favor of the attorney general,
concluding that the attorney general is authorized by the common law to represent the public
interest to the detriment of the governor’s wishes. See, e.g., Feeney v. Commonwealth, 366
N.E.2d 1262, 1266–67 (Mass. 1977) (holding that the attorney general may take a litigation
position contrary to wishes of the executive branch, including those of the governor, because
the attorney general’s common law powers require the attorney general to “consider the
ramifications of [the executive branch’s proposed course of action] on the interests of the
[state] and the public generally”); see also Marshall, supra note 1, at 2460–61 (citing Flor-
ida ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266, 272 (5th Cir. 1976)) (“[T]he Attorney
General’s common law authority is so unfettered that it may allow her to bring suits in the
public interest even when other executive officers or agencies oppose such actions.”). Other
courts, by contrast, conclude that the attorney general lacks the common law power to
represent the public interest and, therefore, must represent the governor’s wishes to the detri-
ment of the attorney general’s interpretation of the public interest. See, e.g., Ariz. State Land
Dep’t v. McFate, 348 P.2d 912, 914, 915, 918 (Ariz. 1960) (noting that the Arizona Attorney
General lacks common law powers, and concluding that the attorney general may not take a
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Court’s most recent treatment of the issue,10 Ryan v. Eighth Judicial District
Court entertains whether the Nevada Attorney General retains common law
powers.11
In Ryan, the state’s attorney general initiated a prosecution against a pub-
lic officer by filing a criminal complaint, alleging that the officer received a
bribe.12 The attorney general presented the complaint before a grand jury, but
the grand jury declined to indict.13 Unwilling to drop the action against the
public officer, the pertinacious attorney general filed an information14 with the
trial court, “independently and without requesting the district attorney . . . to
act.”15
The attorney general claimed that his authority to file the information
derived from NRS §173.035(2), which provided that “the district attorney may
. . . file [an] information” if the accused was previously discharged from a
grand jury’s preliminary examination of the same alleged offense.16 Objecting
to the attorney general’s reliance upon NRS § 173.035(2), the accused peti-
tioned the Nevada Supreme Court, arguing that the provision expressly permit-
ted only a district attorney—and not the attorney general—to file an
information.17
Beyond merely addressing the narrow issue of whether the attorney gen-
eral could file an information pursuant to NRS § 173.035(2), the court widened
its gaze upon the matter, questioning whether any source of law—constitu-
tional, statutory, or common—authorized the attorney general to file an infor-
litigation position in defense of the public interest and adverse to the executive department’s
litigation position unless authorized to do so by statute). Finally, other courts, such as Cali-
fornia’s, uphold the attorney general’s common law power to represent the public interest
but conclude that such representation must yield to the representation of the governor’s
wishes. See, e.g., People ex rel. Deukmejian v. Brown, 624 P.2d 1206, 1209–10 (Cal. 1981).
In Deukmejian, the court acknowledged the California “Attorney General’s dual role as rep-
resentative of [the executive branch] and guardian of the public interest,” but concluded that
the attorney general may not take a position adverse to the executive department in litigation
because, first, the attorney general continuously maintains a client-attorney relationship with
the executive department and, second, the California Constitution placed within the Gover-
nor—and not the attorney general—“the supreme executive power to determine the public
interest” when the governor and the attorney general differ as to the interpretation of the
public interest. Id. at 1209 (internal quotation marks omitted).
10 Fifty years prior to Ryan, the Nevada Supreme Court upheld the Nevada Attorney Gen-
eral’s common law powers. See State ex rel. Fowler v. Moore, 207 P. 75, 76 (Nev. 1922).
11 Ryan v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 503 P.2d 842, 845 (1972).
12 Id. at 842–43.
13 Id. at 843.
14
“A prosecutor . . . who wants to charge someone with a crime either can ask a grand jury
to return an indictment or can file an information without bothering with a grand jury.”
Tyson v. Trigg, 50 F.3d 436, 438 (7th Cir. 1995). Much like a complaint in a civil case, “[a]n
information is a statement by a district attorney or the attorney general to the court that on a
certain day a named person committed an offense against the peace and dignity of the
[s]tate . . . .” Ryan, 503 P.2d at 845.
15 Ryan, 503 P.2d at 842–43.
16 Id. at 843 & n.1. At the time of Ryan, NRS 173.035(2) read as follows: “If, however,
upon the preliminary examination the accused has been discharged . . . the district attorney
may . . . file an information, and process shall forthwith issue thereon.” See id. at 846 n.6
(citing NEV. REV. STAT. § 173.035(2) (1967)).
17 Id. at 842–43.
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mation. Turning first towards the state constitution and statutes, the court
discovered no provisions that expressly empowered the attorney general to file
an information.18  By contrast, the court discovered multiple statutory provi-
sions that expressly empowered the district attorney to file an information.19
Notably, the court focused upon a neighboring provision to NRS §173.035(2)
that provided that the district attorney “shall” file “all” informations.20
The statutory investigation largely quenched the court’s inquiry, leading
the court to conclude that the clear statutory language authorized only the dis-
trict attorney to file an information.21 Nonetheless, the court continued forward,
questioning in a sporting manner whether the common law powers of the attor-
ney general could perhaps provide for a different conclusion.22 The court first
assumed that the common law authorized the attorney general to file an infor-
mation,23 but then concluded that this common law power conflicted with the
statutory provisions that authorized only the district attorney to file an informa-
tion.24  Consequently, the court held that the attorney general’s common law
power to file an information was vacated because the attorney general’s com-
mon law powers exist only to the extent that they are “not repugnant to or in
conflict with the . . . laws of this state.”25
Thus, Ryan illustrates the widely recognized subservience of the common
law to conflicting statutory law.26 But more significantly, because Ryan recog-
18 Id. at 843–44.
19 Id. at 843.
20 Id. (“Indeed, our statutory scheme invests control of the information process in the dis-
trict attorney to the exclusion of others. The legislature wisely has forbidden dual control.
For example, NRS 173.045(1) provides that all informations shall be filed by the district
attorney.”). Incidentally, amendments to NRS §§ 173.035(2) and 173.045(1) enacted follow-
ing the Ryan decision and corresponding legislative history cast a dubious shadow upon the
court’s conclusion that the legislature intended to forbid dual control, for the amended provi-
sions—which “are the result of” Ryan—authorize both the district attorney and the attorney
general to file informations. See Minutes of the Nev. Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary, Assemb.
B. 496, 1975 Leg., 58th Sess. 636–37 (April 16, 1975) (testimony of Pat Walsh, Deputy
Attorney General of Nevada, and Michael Fondi, Carson City District Attorney on Proposed
Amendment to Assemb. B. 496).
21 Ryan, 503 P.2d at 843.
22 Id. at 845.
23 Id. (“Assuming, without deciding, that the common law may have granted the attorney
general the power he here seeks to exercise . . . .”). Whereas the court in Ryan avoided the
dusty exertion of drilling into the depths of the common law to decide whether the filing of a
criminal information was one of the attorney general’s common law powers, other authori-
ties provide conflicting views. See, e.g., State v. Boswell, 4 N.E. 675, 678 (Ind. 1886) (not-
ing that the grand jury indictment is the centuries-old common law method and, by contrast,
“[p]rosecution by information is in derogation of the common law”); Judicial Discretion in
the Filing of Informations, 36 HARV. L. REV. 204, 205 (1922) (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES *309) (explaining that an attorney general’s “proceeding by informa-
tion in the King’s name, in criminal cases, is said to be as old as the common law itself”).
24 Ryan, 503 P.2d at 845.
25 Id. (citing NEV. REV. STAT. § 1.030 (1967)).
26 Many states similarly limit the attorney general’s common law powers to the extent that
those powers conflict with statutory law. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 114-1.1 (2013); State
v. Jiminez, 588 P.2d 707, 709 (Utah 1978); State ex rel. Carmichael v. Jones, 41 So. 2d 280,
284 (Ala. 1949); State v. Finch, 280 P. 910, 913 (Kan. 1929).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\14-3\NVJ315.txt unknown Seq: 5 21-MAY-14 10:00
Summer 2014] COMMON LAW POWERS 1027
nized the attorney general’s common law powers rather than dismissed those
powers, Ryan upholds the Nevada Attorney General’s common law powers,
insofar as those powers harmonize with legislation.
